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Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy 
Responsiveness to Protect Citizens from Existential Threats: COVID-19 and 
Beyond 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
A multitude of government forms and institutional variations have the 
same aims of serving their countries and citizens but vary in outcomes. What it 
means to best serve the citizens is, however, a matter of broad interpretation 
and so the disagreements persist. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic creates 
new metrics for comparing government performance – the metrics of human 
deaths, or, alternatively and as we pursue it here, the metrics of the speed of 
government response in preventing human deaths through policy adoption.  
We argue in this essay that institutional and government systems with 
more authority redundancies are more likely to rapidly generate policy in 
response to crisis and find better policy solutions compared to centralized 
systems with minimal authority redundancies. This is due to a multiplicity of 
access points to policy making, which increase the chances of a policymaker 
crafting the “correct” response to crisis, which can be replicated elsewhere. 
Furthermore, citizens in centralized and unitary governments must rely on 
national policymakers to get the correct response as subnational policymakers 
are highly constrained compared to their counterparts in decentralized systems.   
As policy authority is institutionally defined, these policy authority 
redundancies correspond to specific institutional and constitutional forms. In 
this paper, we provide a mathematical/formal model where we specifically 
analyze the contrast in the speed of policy response between more centralized 
and autocratic states versus democratic federations.  
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Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy 
Responsiveness to Protect Citizens from Existential Threats: COVID-19 and 
Beyond 
 
Politics is all about strategy, and institutions are all about incentives to the strategic 
agents of politics. That is not our focus in this essay, however. Here, we evaluate the baseline 
capacity of political systems that the institutions specify to avert policy error in an existential 
emergency, where all their citizens are immediately threatened, like in the onset of the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
1. Policy responsiveness in an emergency 
A multitude of government forms and institutional variations compete around the world 
in terms of best serving their countries and citizens. What it means to best serve their citizens is, 
however, a matter of broad interpretation and so the disagreements persist. The COVID-19 
pandemic created new metrics for comparison of governments’ performance – the metrics of 
human deaths, or, alternatively and as we pursue it here, the metrics of the speed of government 
response in preventing human deaths through policy adoption (Pueyo 2020). 
We argue in this essay that institutional and government systems with large authority 
redundancies have a greater capacity to generate a quick policy response than systems with 
centralized policy authority because of their ability to error-correct. Furthermore, belief update 
mechanisms and technology-experience evidence operate at a greater pace in high authority 
redundancy systems as compared to centralized authority systems. Redundancy generally 
indicates that multiple organs in the system have the ability to take over the functions of failed 
components either without diminishing the resulting performance of the system or not 
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diminishing it catastrophically (Charbonneau, P. 2017, Haimes 2018). For policies, this means 
that policies of subnational governments can serve as adequate substitutes for their constituents 
for the absent policies of the national government, and vice versa. 
As policy authority is institutionally defined, structural redundancies in policy authority 
correspond to specific institutional and constitutional forms. While such correspondence cannot 
be considered absolute, and informal rules as well as reaching a specific ‘balance’ in authority 
legitimacies can influence the presence of redundancies (see, e.g., Breslawski 2020, Mershon 
and Shvetsova 2019a, 2019b), we here explore the comparison of democracies and autocracies as 
higher- versus lower-redundancy policy mechanisms. Because of the independence of many 
public agencies and the norms of public accountability, we take a democracy to be a more policy 
redundancies-rich environment than autocracies. Here we argue that democracies generally, and 
federal democracies in particular, increase redundancy in policy authority by separately 
empowering agencies and administrators whose accountability is broad and public. This gives 
democracies the mechanism of ‘policy rescue’ by bypassing the events of ‘signal’ error in some 
information chains via parallel information chains that also supply information to the national 
political leadership. Democracies also partially disperse policy authority to independent and 
semi-independent policy agencies. Policy authority is further dispersed in federations, where 
governments at multiple levels have broad overlap in jurisdictions for policy-making. The main 
feature of federations and other decentralized polities is the existence of multiple layers of 
government that overlap in their jurisdictions. In the language of complex systems, federations 
have not only the ‘overlap’ (when only some actions can be taken in several places but others are 
monopolized), but also ‘duplication’ (where everything can be done everywhere in the system) 
(Dekker 2016). In such systems, each citizen can expect support from at least one government 
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operating in each of those layers, and the officials operating those governments have mandates 
(and electoral incentives) to offer such protection.  
Illustrative here is the relative timing in the US and UK policy responses during the 
crucial period of late January-March of 2020, when the spread of COVID-19 was still possible 
initially to contain, and later to substantially reduce. Both nations’ leaders adopted similarly 
dismissive stances during the initial phase of the pandemic, yet while Johnson’s position closely 
corresponded with his country’s policies, Trump’s views coexisted in time with significant 
strong COVID policy response from sub-national authorities and public agencies (Shvetsova et 
al. 2020). 
2. System Redundancies and Policy Authority 
Scholarship on system redundancies in complex systems dates back to the seminal work 
by Von Neumann on reducing error in information processing in automated systems, or the 
“synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components” (Von Neumann 1956). 
Fundamentally, assuming that error in a receiving signal will occur with some independent 
probability in every receiving component, it would reduce the rate of failure of the system to act 
on the signal if multiple components in it are collecting and processing the incoming 
information. Since then, it has become the point of consensus that a systems’ ability to 
adequately withstand various shocks, including external attacks, depends on the system’s 
topology (Newman, Barabasi, and Watts 2009), which in the case of government networks is the 
way in which the receiving and processing of information into decisions is institutionalized. 
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Political institutions, such as constitutions and more, set up systems of policy authority, 
which vary substantially across the globe. Political processes arising from such institutions are 
characterized by authority structures ranging from extremely centralized to extremely diffused. 
Furthermore, surpassing the redundancies as described in automatic systems and at par with 
distributed degenerative biological complex systems (Edelman and Gally 2001), redundancies in 
policy authority structures extend beyond information processing and into what is called the 
overlapping jurisdictions – the ability of multiple semi-autonomous ‘organs’ to produce the same 
policy response. This is akin to an alarm going off separately in the fire station and the police 
department, with both sets of responders showing up on the scene independently. Indeed, in the 
case of overlapping jurisdictions, the alarm effectively goes off in several police stations at once 
and all of them are obligated to respond to the scene independently of each other. Though 
arguably some efficiency may be lost in the latest scenario, the reliability of getting someone to 
show up quickly is increased. 
3. Authority redundancies from Overlapping Policy Jurisdictions Improve Policy 
Responsiveness to Emergencies 
When the system of government has multiple points of access to generating policy 
response, like in federations, the timing of appropriate policy response in a crisis situation is on 
average faster as compared to a system with centralized policy authority. Schematically, we can 
represent the extremes in authority systems’ levels of redundancy as autocracy (totalitarianism) 
on the one end of the spectrum and democratic federalism on the other. Unitary, centralized 
democracies can be tentatively placed in-between.  
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Figure 1 depicts the policy response to new information in fully centralized authority 
structures. One ‘organ’, at the top, receives new information, ‘signals’, and makes policy 
decisions. As the ‘signal’ arrives, there is a probability of error in whether it actually reaches the 
decision-maker or is lost. Notice, that the decision-maker itself does not add the probability of 
error, and accurately reacts to the message that it received: either ‘signal’ or ‘no signal.’ This is 
to say, that the policy maker is assumed to know exactly what to do and be motivated to do just 
that in response to the signal of a public emergency – all politicians are perfect in this rendition. 
In the schematics in Figure 1, the probability of policy error for the fully centralized policy 
authority thus equals the probability of signal error. 
[Figure 1 is here] 
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of centralized but democratic policy making. It is a 
multiplex system, where multiple receptors independently attempt to receive the signal. Again, 
there is positive error probability, or as put by Von Neumann, “with every basic organ is 
associated a positive number ε such that in any operation, the organ will fail to function correctly 
with the (precise) probability ε. This malfunction is assumed to occur statistically independently 
of the general state of the network and of the occurrence of other malfunctions” (p.62). In this 
system, multiple ‘organs’ have a say, as each independently receives the ‘signal,’ each with 
probability 1-ε, which we assume to be the same probability as in Figure 1. The inputs are then 
aggregated via some institutional rule, for example, simple majority, and that information state 
directs the policy decision that single Authority, A, will produce. Unless ε is too high, or the 
level of consensus required for action is too demanding, a multiplex will reduce signal error 
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relatively to the centralized system as in Figure 1. Policy error here is still the same as final 
signal error, but reduced from the base signal error which is exogenously set by the environment. 
[Figure 2 is here] 
Figure 3 represents the federal structure. Instead of aggregating information according to 
some institutional rule, each ‘organ’ receiving the signal has a decision-making function, each 
constituting a separate policy authority. These policy authorities coexist insofar as their 
jurisdictions overlap, i.e., when either one of them can produce the policy that covers citizen i. 
Because the same policy function is performed by either one or all of these decision-makers, the 
system like this has policy redundancies built in. In the language used for biological systems, the 
system is degenerate. 
[Figure 3 is here] 
Political institutions and political process of federalism generate systems of overlapping 
jurisdictions, as in Figure 3. Our model below pertains to the institutional form of overlapping 
jurisdictions. Federations also have non-overlapping jurisdictions, policy-making when restricted 
to which amounts to centralized policy making in a multiplex system (as in Figure 2) applied to 
disjoint subsets of the country’s population. We do not incorporate this feature in the model. We 
also exclude for simplicity the multiplex nature of inputs that various policy authorities with 
overlapping jurisdictions might each rely on. While this is certainly an important aspect to 
further explore in the future, e.g., when comparing inputs from centralized versus federalized 
specialist agencies, this is beyond our current scope.  
4. Redundancies in policy authority and independent learning 
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To give our model an intuitive interpretation, suppose that the emergency is the COVID-
19 pandemic and the policy that is appropriate upon receiving the ‘signal’ is a stay-at-home 
order. Once such signal is sent – once the information is available that extreme epidemiological 
measures are necessary (perhaps obtained from observation and research of an outbreak 
elsewhere in the world) – our presumed automaton-policy makers who receive the signal 
automatically do what is needed. Those that receive the signal, perfectly adhere to their public 
mandate and at the earliest opportunity issue the stay-at-home policy. Each policy-maker 
receives the signal (conditionally in the signal going out) with the probability 1-ε.  
In order to evaluate redundancy-based advantages in system responsiveness, we compare 
responsiveness in the centralized authority schema in Figure 1 with the federal schema in Figure 
3. Specifically, our comparison is aimed at the probability of policy error as experienced by a 
sample citizen served by each of these authority systems. Policy error as experienced by a citizen 
is the outcome for a citizen of a likely deadly infection in the context of a failing healthcare 
system, if we follow the same COVID-19 pandemic interpretation. 
Formally, we denote the set of all governments in a polity as 𝐺, and its subset, the set of 
all governments responsible for protecting a representative citizen 𝑖, as 𝐽𝑖 ⊆ 𝐺. According to our 
definition, federal polities are characterized by the set 𝐺 having at least three elements and the 
set 𝐽𝑖 having at least 2 elements. We will assume for present purposes that in unitary states, |𝐺| =
|𝐽𝑖| = 1. This makes our theorized unitary state quite stylized, as of course in reality multiple 
administrative levels exist there as well, with varying policy prerogatives delegated down to 
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them in different nations. This also takes out of the consideration by the unitary democratic 
model the potential policy authority of public agencies. 
Each government, 𝑗𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝑖, independently from other governments, monitors the 
environment for the threats to the citizen 𝑖. Once a threat is on the horizon, they try to learn as 
much as possible about it and make a policy according to the severity of the threat. Here we will 
focus on a single threat with true severity 𝜃 and assume that this variable can only take values of 
0 and 1. We also assume that there are only two types of policies a government can choose: 
protect and not protect, 𝑃 = {0,1}, and that this policy will affect a citizen if and only if the 
citizen is in that government’s jurisdiction. 
Assuming that automaton-authorities process received signals perfectly and adopt the 
subsequent policy error-free, we construct the base model of a governments’ learning and 
reaction. As a government sets out to investigate the threat, it randomly (and independently from 
other governments) samples the body of evidence. We assume that the body of evidence consists 
of the messages of two types – the ones suggesting that the threat is severe (𝜃 = 1), true 
messages. The other type are the messages suggesting that the threat is not severe (𝜃 = 0), or 
erroneous messages. The proportion of the messages that correctly reflect the true state generally 
depends on the true state. Here we assume that the proportion of the erroneous messages is ε, 
with ε ∈ (0, 1). That is, the pool of evidence necessarily contains both accurate and inaccurate 
messages. If the true message is that the threat is high, 𝜃=1, then the probability of receiving the 
message that the threat is low is ε.  
Formally, denote the message that government 𝑗 selects from the pool as 𝜇𝑗 ∈ {0,1}. 
Then from the assumptions above, 
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Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − ε    ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
For now, we assume out the ability of the government to choose a reaction. Each 
government is programmed to act upon the first message it picks from the pool of evidence and 
to choose protective policies if this message suggests that the threat is high and non-protective 
policies if the message suggests otherwise. To state formally,  𝑝𝑗(𝜇𝑗) = 𝜇𝑗. 
Proposition 1. If citizen 𝑖 is facing a severe threat, the probability that he will receive 
protection is (1 − ε𝑚), where 𝑚 = |𝐽𝑖|. 
Proof: Denote the event that government 𝑗 protects citizen 𝑖 as 𝑄𝑖
𝑗
. Since a government’s 
response does not affect the citizens outside of its jurisdiction,  
⋃ 𝑄𝑖
𝑗
𝑗∈𝐺
= ⋃ 𝑄𝑖
𝑗
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖
= (⋂(𝑄𝑖
𝑗)
𝐶
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖
)
𝐶
 
Since 𝑝𝑗(𝜇𝑗) = 𝜇𝑗,  Pr ((𝑄𝑖
𝑗)
𝐶
|𝜃 = 1) = Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = ε. Since the messages 
sampled by governments are independent from the messages sampled by other government, 
Pr (⋂ (𝑄𝑖
𝑗)
𝐶
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 |𝜃 = 1) =  ∏ Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 0|𝜃 = 1)
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖
=  ε|𝐽𝑖| 
Thus, the probability that the citizen 𝑖 receives protection from any government 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 is  
Pr(⋃ 𝑄𝑖
𝑗
𝑗∈𝐺 |𝜃 = 1) = 1 − Pr (⋂ (𝑄𝑖
𝑗)
𝐶
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 | 𝜃 = 1) = 1 − ε
𝑚, 
where 𝑚 = |𝐽𝑖|, the number of layers of government with a mandate to protect citizen 𝑖. □ 
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Corollary 1. A citizen is more likely to enjoy protection from threats in a decentralized 
polity than in a unitary state. 
Proof: By assumption,  0 < ε < 1, therefore 
𝑑
𝑑𝑥
(1 − ε𝑚) = − ln(ε) ε𝑚 > 0  and 1 −
ε𝑚 > 1 − ε  ∀  𝑚 > 1. □ 
Notice once again that by assuming that decision makers are automatons, Proposition 1 
implicitly assumed that all politicians are the same: honest, educated, hardworking, and decisive. 
Also that they all have their constituents’ full mandate to protect them from the extreme public 
health threat.1  
The probability that the correct signal would reach somebody and inform policy-making 
in at least one layer of government with jurisdiction over citizen i  is 1 − ε𝑚, which is greater 
than the unitary government probability of 1 − 𝜀. A citizen in a federal democracy is more likely 
to receive a public health policy that would protect her than a citizen in a unitary democracy or in 
an autocracy. Of course, since Proposition 1 applies to a single information period, this 
conclusion also applies to a single information period. In the next period, the next ‘signal’ 
arrives, and governments that made an error in period 1 will have an opportunity to correct their 
policy choices then, or possibly even later. 
5. Policy dissemination in diffused authority structures 
Policy dissemination occurs through beliefs update: observing the policy response in peer 
jurisdictions helps a politician to make the right choice. Politicians can learn how real the threat 
is by observing how other politicians are responding. In other words, they can update their 
                                                          
1 This result parallels the results for generally specified “performance levels” in Bender (1985, p. 46-48). 
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beliefs by watching each other. This is important, because the actions of other policy makers 
indicate which type of signal those policy makers have received. 
In the model that we specified in Figure 1, there are a lot of certainties. If a politician 
manages to receive the signal to act, we assumed she knows with probability 1 – with certainty – 
that her information is accurate. We also assumed that she enacts the policy with probability 1 if 
she received the signal, and with probability 0 if she did not. This all is sufficient for another 
politician, who has previously failed to act, to update her beliefs to a certainty that action is 
necessary, when she observes at least one among the rest of jurisdictions adopting the policy. 
In our model, adoption of a strict policy indicates that the received signal was that such 
policy is necessary. In our model, also, we already know that the signal is a true one. In a more 
general specification, a politician does not know that for a fact, so she weighs her information 
critically. In line with the automaton analogy, we must allow for the possibility of different 
machines having different built-in biases for their response. We assumed no biases toward 
information of a particular type or from a particular source, but the decision-maker may in fact 
be “built” with such a bias. Besides, even if one’s own signal is missed, observation of what the 
other governments have done may affect policy correction even without any additional new 
signals. We show below, that the direction of the update from observing a peer politician 
implementing a strict policy is towards implementing a similarly strict policy in own jurisdiction, 
too.  
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A slightly more complex model of learning and decision allows to capture these 
additional benefits of policy authority redundancies. In this model, we assume that each 
government is a Bayesian decision-making automaton. 
Governments share some prior beliefs that will affect not their perception of the threat 
itself, but of the necessity to respond to the threat, should it arise, with a protective policy. We 
assume that these beliefs are biased, in the signaling sense, meaning that they are consequential 
in decision-making because of putting a higher probability on the “rightness” of one course of 
action over another. Substantively, this action prior, 𝜙0, might have been determined by the 
constituency’s and government’s past history, recent policy episodes, the way its healthcare 
system prioritizes public versus private health, etc. We will interpret this probability 𝜙0 as the 
predisposition of politicians to perceive the threat, 𝜃 = 1, as an epidemiological threat requiring 
some government-led public health response rather than treat it as a matter for doctors and 
patients.  
As before, governments randomly and independently from each other sample the 
messages about the threat 𝜃 = 1 from a pool of evidence that contains 𝜀 proportion of false 
messages.  
In order to account for the individual biases of a government, we add a parameter that 
describes each government j’s perception of each information source,  𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , where K is a set of 
all information sources. Specifically, we define  ?̂? as a set of probability distributions for each 
government over their individual (thus subjective) “trust” in each specific information source. 
Each “trust” probability function,  𝜀?̂?,𝑘, returns government j’s subjective probability of 
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dismissing the signal  𝜃 = 1  if its source is k. This assumption is just a complication on our 
previous discussion, where it was in effect assumed that all 𝜀̂ were similar and equaled ε. 
Further assume that each government accrues political benefit 𝑏 > 0 if it shields the 
citizen in time of crisis. The cost of the protective measures, including their political cost, is  𝑐 >
0. 
In Stage 1, the government learns and makes a policy determination based on the 
message that it received on its own. Assuming that the government’s prior beliefs are not enough 
to push them into action regardless of the signal, such as for example maintaining strict public 
health protocols just because that would be a good precaution to do so and so should be their 
standard operating procedure, that government’s prior is such that 
1 − 𝜙0
𝜙0
>  
𝑏 − 𝑐
𝑐
 
 The cost-benefit condition for whether the protective measures will be implemented only 
by the governments that drew cautionary messages and only if  
1 − 𝜙0
𝜙0
𝜀̂
1 − 𝜀̂
<  
𝑏 − 𝑐
𝑐
 (1) 
As long as condition (1) is satisfied, Proposition 1 also holds for this model of decision-
making. If the threat is real and condition 1 holds citizen 𝑖 will be protected with probability 
(1 − ∏ 𝜀?̂?,𝑘(𝑘)𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 ), which is greater than any individual 𝜀?̂?,𝑘. 
From condition (1), the critical factors of the decision-making include the distrust to the 
evidence that the government receives, the relative costs of implementing the protective 
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measures and the value of human life, as well as the prior beliefs about how appropriate it is to 
respond to the threat with policy in addition to medicine. 
In Stage 2, governments in addition can observe the policies if those are adopted by other 
governments in the polity. Suppose once again that error probabilities are perceived similarly by 
all governments, i.e., that 𝜀?̂?,𝑘 = 𝜀 ̂𝑘, the prior is neutral, and that the cost-benefit calculus is such 
that every government responds if the message it received is 𝜃𝑘 = 1. Then given the share of 
faulty messages in the pool of evidence, they will expect to observe ⌊|𝐽|(1 − 𝜀)⌋ strong policy 
responses, and ⌊|𝐽|𝜀⌋ governments that do not issue a response. With these data, the updated 
beliefs about the severity of a threat in this much simplified set up, as long as 𝜀 < 1/2, and the 
true state of the world is  𝜃𝑘 = 1  – the threat is in fact severe, the protective policy is likely to 
fully propagate in such a system even to the governments that did not receive the correct 
message, in which case the probability that citizen i receives policy protection after the first 
signal becomes 1.  
If we return to the story that some governments are more cautious about the evidence 
than others and that some governments’ costs of implementing protective measures (relatively to 
the value of a citizen’s health) are higher than others’, some may not implement the policy even 
if they observe the signal that  𝜃𝑘 = 1. Assume for example that 
𝑏−𝑐
𝑐
 follows a continuous 
distribution with probability function 𝐹(∙), and that the prior in 𝐽 is once again biased. In this 
case, the probability that a citizen gets protected is  
Pr(⋃ 𝑄𝑖
𝑗
𝑗∈𝐺 |𝜃 = 1) = 1 − (𝐹(𝑥))
|𝐽𝑖|, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥 =
1 − 𝜙0
𝜙0
(
𝜀̂
1 − 𝜀̂
)
⌊|𝐽|(1−2?̂?)⌋
(2) 
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From equation (2), the chances that a citizen is protected increase with the number of 
governments in the polity and with the number of layers of the government. 
6. Conclusion 
An order like shelter in place is a very costly policy to the constituents, is very disruptive 
to lifestyles and to the economy, and it is also a type of policy that needs to be implemented 
early, prior to the public actually witnessing how high the health costs of not doing so would 
become. Thus an honest politician would not issue such an order unless she received a signal 
(information) that would clearly require such drastic response. (In truth, even a dishonest 
politician has no incentives to rush such an order because, if done right, the public would be 
protected from the virus and not experience health-related losses, affected only by the economic 
losses from the protective measures). 
Thus even while limiting the present enquiry to the structural institutional capacity for 
quick policy response, we can speculate that multiple access points to policy-making can lead to 
cost reductions. The ability to observe and compare efficacy of multiple alternative solutions to 
the same underlying problem would lead to the improvement of the technology of policy 
response as policy-makers correct their choices to adopt the higher-performing solutions 
(Weingast 1995). Late adopters face lower administrative cost from policy design and 
implementation, as they can learn from the experience of success and failure of policy elements 
in the early-adopter jurisdictions. 
Another form of cost – the political price to pay from the fallout from the disgruntled 
constituents is also reduced, as they observe multiple decision-makers responding to the same 
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signal and so can update their own beliefs regarding whether the policy in their locale is truly 
justified.  
Furthermore, as additional information continues to arrive, and either repeats or 
strengthens the original signal, policy correction becomes more and more likely even in a fully 
centralized authority structure. If the same signal is simply repeated, that gives a politician 
another chance to receive it. If a new, stronger signal is sent, the chance that the politician will 
receive it now is higher than in the previous period with a weaker signal. Stronger signals can be 
interpreted as signals sent by more authoritative sources (the message is thus better heard), or 
more sources reiterating the same message (the message is louder).  
As we assess the benefits of structural redundancies, it is only right to acknowledge that 
these come with potential efficiency losses. Aside from operating and electing multiple 
governments, extra costs might be accrued from policy inefficiencies due to replicating efforts 
within jurisdictions and such things as outbidding for resources (though see Bendor 1985). There 
may arise enforcement inefficiencies due to inter-jurisdictional policy discrepancies, along with 
‘arbitrage’ opportunities for economic agents who operate across jurisdictional borders. 
Additional resource limitations might come from implementing a policy at a government level 
either below or above that which would be optimal for the task. Even the policy designs 
themselves may be inferior from the outset sue to the severity of the budget and resource 
constraints in isolated jurisdictions. And inconsistency in policy articulated for the same 
constituents by different levels of government may have not only enforcement, but also 
legitimacy implications. 
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A very important structural consideration that could be added further is the “quality” of 
the automaton which we assume the decision-maker is. Continuing the machine analogy, both 
processing and decision –making capacity may be high or low as that machine’s pre-set 
characteristic. 
While many more features of institutional and decision-making structures could be 
brought into analysis, our conclusion here makes possible the baseline comparison. In the short 
term, constitutional regimes with greater authority redundancies have the structural capacity to 
offer citizens faster protective policy response from new uncertain threats. Thus when not weeks, 
but days and even hours count, such systems have the structural capacity to save more lives. 
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 Figure 1. Centralized Authority System 
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Figure 2. Multiple Inputs Authority System (centralized democracy) 
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Figure 3. Multiple Policy Authority System (federations) 
 
s
ignal
 i
signal
A 
POLICY
A
signal
signal
signal
ε
ε
ε
ε
A 
a 
a 
POLICY
APOLICY
A
POLICY
A
